000 01907nab a22002657a 4500
999 _c8117
_d8117
005 20250625151635.0
008 230419s2020 -nz|| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040 _aAFVC
100 _aHigh, Anna
_910386
245 _aThe 'any evidence' rule in New Zealand family law
_cAnna High and Caroline Hickman
260 _bNew Zealand Law Foundation,
_c2020
500 _aNew Zealand Law Review, 2020, 29(1) 49-74
520 _aThe ‘any evidence’ rule provides judicial discretion to admit evidence in the Family Court that would otherwise be inadmissible. Although the rule has frequently been criticised, its operation and ongoing value have not been closely examined. In its recently-reformed iteration, the ‘any evidence’ rule embodies and demands a rigorous approach to evidentiary issues in the Family Court, premised on fundamental Evidence Act principles of relevance, probative value and prejudicial effect. In this first comprehensive review of the New Zealand family law ‘any evidence’ rule, based on an analysis of post-reform case law, we argue that the rule should be repealed. It is unnecessary, other than in relation to the special issue of children’s hearsay, and in practice contributes to a lax approach to the admission of evidence in the Family Court. We conclude by setting out recommendations for reformed law and practice, and directing users towards a more principled approach to family law evidence in the meantime. (Authors' abstract). Record #8117
650 _aFAMILY COURT
_9241
650 _aFAMILY LAW
_9244
650 _aCHILDREN
_9127
650 _aEVIDENCE
_9237
650 _aLAW REFORM
_9338
651 4 _aNEW ZEALAND
_92588
700 _aHickman, Caroline
_98458
773 _tNew Zealand Law Review, 2020, 29(1) 49-74
830 _aNew Zealand Law Review
_95171
856 _uhttp://hdl.handle.net/10523/12221
_zRead online
942 _2ddc
_cARTICLE