000			02217nab a22002657a 4500
999			_c8116 _d8116
005			20250625151635.0
008			230419s2022 -nz|| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aAFVC
100			_aHigh, Anna _910386
245			_aReluctant consent _cAnna High
260			_bNew Zealand Law Society, _c2022
500			_aNew Zealand Law Journal, October 2022, 310-324
520			_aIn New Zealand sexual violence trials, the standard reluctant consent direction states that “consent which is given reluctantly and later regretted is nevertheless consent”. The concept of reluctant consent is a vestige of case law which held that consent can be given “unwillingly”, a contradiction in terms which relates to an outdated understanding of submission as consent. Today, reluctant consent is understood as a corollary of the “full, voluntary, free and informed” consent direction, which disallows for the possibility of unwilling consent. However, the idea of “reluctant consent” has continued to attract criticism (see, for example, Elisabeth McDonald Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process (Canterbury University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 297). Further, the Court of Appeal has recently suggested that the reluctant consent direction may need revisiting in light of the Supreme Court decision of Christian v R [2017] NZSC 145, [2018] 1 NZLR 315, which held that consent analysis must be grounded in statutory wording. In this article, I interrogate the place of reluctant consent, both as a socio-legal concept and as the subject of jury directions, in sexual violence law. I argue that “reluctant consent” is both legally and socially logical, and not a contradiction in terms. However, there are two more substantive problems with the “reluctant consent” direction. (From the introduction). Record #8116
650			_aATTITUDES _970
650			_aCONSENT _94690
650			_aCRIMINAL JUSTICE _9167
650			_aEVIDENCE _9237
650			_aLAW REFORM _9338
650			_aRAPE _9488
650		4	_aSEXUAL VIOLENCE _9531
651		4	_aNEW ZEALAND _92588
773	0		_tNew Zealand Law Journal, October 2022, 310-324
830			_aNew Zealand Law Journal _94723
942			_2ddc _cARTICLE