Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Bachelor of Laws with Honours.

This dissertation examines the admissibility of psychological evidence in child sexual abuse cases. The use of this type of evidence is regulated by the law of evidence, which states that psychological evidence is admissible only if the child displays behaviours that are compellingly and unmistakably consistent with sexual abuse. Psychologists and psychiatrists giving expert testimony must have clinical experience with children who have been sexually abused. The author provides an analysis of the Evidence Act (1908), including a list of behaviours classed as consistent with sexual abuse under s23(g) of this piece of legislation. The difficulty in determining the effects of sexual abuse, and what behaviours constitute a 'consistency' with sexual abuse is emphasised. The author argues for changes to s23(g) of the Evidence Act, such as increased emphasis on research and scientific evidence as opposed to clinical experience, and a clear definition of 'consistent with sexual abuse'. The author contends that psychological evidence is admissible if the testimony has scientific reliability.

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